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The last few decades have seen a dramatic shift in the admissibility of expert testimony in
American courtrooms from a laissez-faire approach to a strict standard for admissibility,
often called the Daubert test. The implicit rationale behind such a stringent standard
for admissibility is the trier of fact’s vulnerability to adversarial bias, which many legal
scholars and practitioners assume to be rampant. Employing a standard litigation model
in the literature, I demonstrate that client–expert relationships may not always exhibit
adversarial bias and that a litigant may voluntarily present neutral expert testimony under
certain situations. I also show that a litigant is more likely to deploy hired guns if the
litigation environment is more favorable to his cause. In particular, the burden of proof
assignment and the court’s prior belief are shown to influence adversarial bias.
Keywords: litigation game; evidence distortion; adversarial bias; Daubert test.
JEL: C72; D82; K41.
1 Introduction
Before the 1980s, courts were quite lenient toward expert testimony, allowing the trier of fact
to decide the weight of the evidence if the evidence presented in the court was not compelling.
Thus, the admissibility of expert testimony was not a major issue, and this approach allowed
virtually all expert witnesses to testify on subject matter within their expertise.1
However, during the 1980s, there was considerable debate regarding the admissibility of
expert testimony, especially owing to the rise of toxic tort litigation, which alleged that ex-
posure to pharmaceuticals, pollutants, or other toxic substances (such as the herbicide Agent
∗I am grateful to the editor, Eric Helland, and William Hubbard for their valuable comments that substan-
tially improved this paper. All remaining errors are mine.
†School of Economics, Yonsei University, Seoul, Korea (chulyoung.kim@gmail.com).
1See Kaye et al. (2010) for a discussion of the traditional rules for the admissibility of expert testimony.
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Orange) caused cancer, birth defects or other ailments.2 The cases often rested largely on tes-
timony from experts who were hired by the litigants.3 With the increasing number of experts
providing causation theories that were often dubious but helpful to their clients, legal scholars
and commentators began to worry about adversarial bias in client–expert relationships.4
Since then, the Supreme Court has made a series of important decisions, beginning with
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc.,5 which set a strict standard for the admissibility of
expert testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was eventually amended in 2000, requiring
experts to pass a stringent reliability test, often called the Daubert test, to be qualified to give
testimony in court. Rule 702 provides that expert testimony that would otherwise be helpful
to the jury is admissible only when (i) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, (ii)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (iii) the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.6
The history of the Daubert test suggests that the implicit rationale behind such a strin-
gent standard for admissibility is the trier of fact’s vulnerability to the existence of adversarial
bias.7 Proponents of the test argue that as parties to litigation have incentive to present ex-
pert testimony of dubious validity and as lay juries are incapable of discerning which side has
the better case, the Daubert test can alleviate the problem of adversarial bias by providing at-
torneys with the opportunity to challenge whether the other side’s proffered expert testimony
is reliable.
Arguments for the Daubert test and adversarial bias invite the following theoretical in-
quiries from law and economics scholars: do client–expert relationships always exhibit adver-
sarial bias? In other words, is it possible that litigants voluntarily present neutral, unbiased
expert testimony? If so, under which situations will they do so?
2For discussions on these mass tort cases, see, for example, Angell (1997), Green (1998), Sanders (1998),
and Schuck (1988).
3For example, the case brought by the Carmichaels against Kumho Tire Co. in 1993 rested largely on
testimony from a tire failure expert. This case eventually led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
4For a discussion on adversarial bias, see, for example, Bernstein (2008). See also Olympia Equip. Leasing
Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It is thus one more illustration of the
old problem of expert witnesses who are “often the mere paid advocates or partisans of those who employ and
pay them, as much so as the attorneys who conduct the suit. There is hardly anything, not palpably absurd
on its face that cannot now be proved by some so-called ‘experts.’””); E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Co., Inc.
v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995) (“[T]here are some experts who ‘are more than willing to proffer
opinions of dubious value for the proper fee.’”).
5Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S.
136 (1997) and Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
6Given the radical shift toward a more stringent standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, many
legal scholars and practitioners disagree with it. For example, after a recent review of Milward v. Acuity
Specialty Products Group, Inc., 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011), the First Circuit reversed the district court’s
ruling excluding causation evidence in a toxic tort case, holding that relying on the weight of the evidence
constitutes a reliable scientific methodology.
7Bernstein (2008) defines adversarial bias as “witness bias that arises because a party to an adversarial
proceeding retains experts to advance its cause” and argues that the existence of adversarial bias justifies the
application of the Daubert test in courts’ decision-making.
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The goal of this paper is to investigate these issues in a formal economic model, which
is, to the best of my knowledge, the first attempt to do so in the literature. Employing a
standard litigation model in the literature, I demonstrate that client–expert relationships may
not always exhibit adversarial bias and that a litigant may voluntarily present neutral expert
testimony under certain situations. I also show that a litigant is more likely to deploy hired
guns if the litigation environment is more favorable to his cause. In particular, the burden of
proof assignment and the court’s prior belief influence a litigant’s incentive to deploy hired
guns in equilibrium.
The intuition behind a litigant’s decision to voluntarily present neutral expert testimony
is as follows. In equilibrium, the burden of proof is assigned to one party, and that party
is required to present hard evidence for his cause to win at trial. If the litigant appoints a
biased expert who is willing to distort evidence toward the cause of the litigant, the expert will
suppress unfavorable evidence and reveal only favorable evidence to the court. However, em-
ploying such a biased expert is not beneficial for the litigant for two reasons. First, suppressing
unfavorable evidence is not beneficial because the litigant with the burden of proof will lose
at trial unless his expert reveals favorable evidence for his cause. Second, the litigant with the
burden of proof is required to present hard evidence for his cause to win at trial. However,
as evidence is assumed to be verifiable, an expert cannot fabricate favorable evidence. Thus,
the frequency with which a biased expert presents favorable evidence at trial is equal to that
with which an unbiased expert presents favorable evidence. Consequently, the litigant with
the burden of proof is indifferent between a biased expert and an unbiased expert, and he
may therefore voluntarily appoint an unbiased expert in equilibrium. Propositions 1 and 2
provide formal statements.
Somewhat surprisingly, despite the voluminous research articles and commentaries criticiz-
ing litigants’ incentive to deploy hired guns,8 the literature on expert evidence law has largely
neglected the possibility that a litigant may voluntarily proffer unbiased expert testimony.9
8Krafka et al. (2002) report that the most serious problem perceived by judges regarding expert evidence is
that “experts abandon objectivity and become advocates for the side that hired them.” The partisan nature of
expert testimony proffered by litigants has been widely criticized: see, for example, Langbein (1985) (describing
“systematic distrust and devaluation of expertise” by the American people), Gross (1991) (“Experts whose
incomes depend on testimony must learn to satisfy the consumers who buy that testimony; those who do
not will not get hired”), Bernstein (2008) (“... attorneys can shop from an almost unlimited pool of expert
witnesses”), Liptak (2008) (quoting Professor William R. Freudenburg, “The legal system and the scientific
method ... co-exist in a way that is really hard on truth”), Mnookin (2008) (“... those witnesses who succeed
in the marketplace for experts within our adversarial process will often not be those with the most knowledge
or actual expertise in a particular area, but rather those whom parties believe will succeed in persuading
the fact-finder”), Robertson (2010) (“Through selection, affiliation, and compensation biases, litigants make
experts more favorable but less accurate compared to their base rates of accuracy in the real world”), and
Haw (2012) (“If, out of one hundred experts, ninety-nine agree on a proposition, one side may call the outlier,
and the other may call one of the heartland experts. This will make a real-world ratio of 99:1 appear, in the
courtroom, closer to 1:1”).
9Haw (2012) notes: “... most indictments of legal science start with the premise that expert witnesses are
biased or untruthful.”
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Although some scholars argue that professional experts may have an incentive to render unbi-
ased opinions owing to ethical concern or reputation,10 eventually, the litigant or his attorney
determines whether such unbiased testimony will be heard at court, and most legal scholars
and commentators seem to downplay such a possibility.11 Moreover, the relationship between
litigation environments and a litigant’s incentive to present unbiased testimony has not yet
been addressed in the literature. Thus, this paper contributes to the literature on expert evi-
dence law by presenting an uninvestigated mechanism through which litigation environments
influence adversarial bias, along with policy implications.
The key feature of the main model is the evidence distortion and inference problem. A
suitable economic model with which to analyze this problem is the persuasion-game framework
presented by Milgrom (1981). Using a seller–buyer example as an illustration, he studies the
ways in which a buyer draws inferences about a product’s quality in the face of a seller’s
incentive to conceal evidence detrimental to the sale of the product. He shows that the
equilibrium is characterized by “full revelation,” in which the seller reveals all relevant evidence
about the product. Extending his analysis, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) study decision-
making under evidence distortion by competing litigants and confirm the robustness of the
full revelation phenomenon. The reason for the full revelation of relevant information in
these models is that the informed party (e.g., an expert in our context) always possesses some
information. If this assumption is relaxed, that is, the informed party may not possess relevant
information, then the party with the information advantage may distort the evidence in
equilibrium, inducing the uninformed party (e.g., a court in our context) to draw an inference
about the hidden evidence. See Shin (1998), Demougin and Fluet (2008), Kim (2014, 2015a),
and references therein for this line of research in a litigation setting.12 All these papers assume
that litigants conceal unfavorable evidence whenever possible when presenting evidence to the
trier of fact. I relax this assumption and study a litigant’s incentive to choose between biased
10Sorrel (2007) reports: “When New York dermatopathologist A. Bernard Ackerman, MD, is called to
testify as a medical expert witness, he refuses to know which side the lawyer represents. It is his way of
remaining objective when he evaluates a case.” Some experimental results present evidence showing that
experts in a courtroom setting may render unbiased opinions. For example, Boudreau and McCubbins (2008)
analyze experimentally the conditions under which competition between experts induces them to make truthful
statements. They find that competition induces enough truth telling to allow jurors to improve their decisions,
which provides some support for the game theoretic arguments raised by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Froeb
and Kobayashi (1996), who suggest that competition between interested parties will lead to the revelation of
truthful information.
11Bernstein (2013) notes: “The underlying problem critics identified is that attorneys seeking expert wit-
nesses do not, and have no incentive to, pursue expertise wherever it leads. Rather, they search for an expert
willing to support the litigant’s position.”
12These papers assume that the probability with which the expert observes the hidden evidence is common
knowledge in the game. In contrast, in another work by Kim (2015b), this probability is not common knowledge;
rather, the court must infer this probability during the fact-finding process before rendering its final verdict
at trial. In this framework, Kim studies the benefits and costs of a stringent admissibility standard and finds




The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model
suitable for an analysis of adversarial bias. Section 3 solves the model and presents the main
results, Propositions 1 and 2. Section 4 concludes with a discussion about extensions and
implications of the main results.
2 An Economic Model for Adversarial Bias
Consider a legal dispute in which a defendant is brought to trial for allegedly inflicting harm
on a plaintiff. For example, the defendant may be a firm accused of dispersing a toxic chemical
into a river from which the plaintiff draws water. The truth, t, takes one of two possible values,
t ∈ {h, l}, where t = l indicates that the defendant is liable for the wrongdoing and t = h
indicates that he is in fact not liable despite the plaintiff’s complaint. The court aspires to
render a verdict that correctly identifies the truth: it seeks to uphold the plaintiff’s cause if the
defendant is truly liable, that is, t = l, and to uphold the defendant’s cause if the defendant
is in fact not liable, that is, t = h. More precisely, I assume that the court obtains a payoff of
1 from a correct decision and a payoff of 0 otherwise.13 In contrast to the court’s preference,
the defendant always seeks to be exonerated from the charge of the alleged wrongdoing and
thereby obtain a payoff of 1. The defendant obtains a payoff of 0 if he is found liable. The
plaintiff faces a similar payoff structure: he obtains a payoff of 1 if his cause prevails and 0
otherwise.
If the court perfectly knows the truth regarding the defendant’s liability, it can correctly
differentiate a liable defendant from a non-liable one, thereby rendering a correct verdict.
However, courts may err in rendering a verdict in reality because courts often have access to
only a limited amount of information regarding a particular dispute. During an adversary
proceeding, the case is presented, and evidence is revealed to the court, thereby inducing
the court to form its own assessment regarding the hidden truth. The court’s assessment
is summarized by the prior belief, µ = P (t = h) ∈ (0, 1). A high value of µ indicates that
the court believes that the defendant is not liable with a high probability based on all of the
evidence presented and accumulated during the proceeding thus far. A low value of µ carries
the opposite meaning.
An important form of information at trial is expert testimony proffered by the litigants.14
As an expert is someone who is better equipped than a layperson through her “knowledge,
13This assumption implies that in the face of uncertainty regarding the truth, the court operates on the
preponderance of evidence standard, that is, the court upholds the plaintiff’s cause if the defendant is more
likely to be liable than not, and vice versa.
14Although expert witnesses are selected and retained by the litigants in the current American legal system,
many legal scholars have argued for a reform toward a centralized system for expert testimony, which would
allow courts to appoint neutral experts. See Section 4.6 for a related discussion.
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skill, experience, training, or education” (Federal Rule of Evidence 702) to perceive the truth
in her specialized domain, her testimony can provide the court with valuable information
about the dispute.15 For instance, the accused firm in the example above may hire a chemistry
professor to testify about the safety of the toxic chemical that the firm is accused of dispersing.
Although experts are presumably neutral to the case under consideration, willing to pro-
vide honest testimony without intentionally withholding any relevant evidence, an expert can
be biased toward a litigant in the sense that their interests may be aligned. Such a situation
may occur in reality because (i) experts’ compensation is often tied to the litigation outcome
and (ii) a litigant may retain experts who share the same opinions or views as the litigant’s.
As this paper aims to study the conditions under which a litigant prefers to retain an unbiased
expert rather than a biased one, I assume that two types of expert exist: unbiased and biased
experts.
Formally, there exists one hidden piece of evidence x that may take one of two possible
values, x ∈ {H,L}, where x = H is a piece of evidence supporting the claim that the defendant
is not liable, that is, t = h, and x = L supports the other cause. This hidden evidence
can be uncovered by experts and revealed to the court. As an expert is knowledgeable but
not perfectly informed about the dispute, I assume that an expert can observe the hidden
evidence only with a positive probability. More precisely, the expert hired by the defendant
(the plaintiff) observes x with probability eD ∈ (0, 1) (eP ∈ (0, 1)).16 This probability can be
interpreted as the expert’s level of skill or experience. As this probability increases toward 1,
the expert is more likely to possess a relevant piece of information about the truth. I assume
that evidence x is realized according to the conditional density, P (H|h) = P (L|l) ≡ p > 12 .
When called to testify to the court, the expert’s testimony takes the following form: if the
expert observed the evidence, she either reports it truthfully to the court or does not provide
any evidence; in the latter case, the expert is intentionally withholding valuable evidence.
If the expert could not observe the evidence, she cannot provide any evidence to the court,
as fabricating evidence is not allowed in the courtroom.17 If an expert does not reveal any
evidence at trial, the court cannot obtain any explicit evidence from the expert. However,
although the expert does not reveal any evidence, the court can still obtain implicit evidence
about the truth: if the court employs Bayesian reasoning in assessing the expert’s testimony,
it can infer that the expert does not reveal any evidence under two possible circumstances,
that is, either when the expert could not observe the hidden evidence or when the expert is
15Gross (1991) notes that experts testified in 86% of civil trials in a sample of California cases tried between
1985 and 1986.
16Thus, there are four possibilities: (i) both experts do not observe x, (ii − iii) only one of the experts
observes x, and (iv) both experts observe the same piece of evidence x. This is a standard modeling approach
in the literature; see, for example, Shin (1998), Demougin and Fluet (2008), and Kim (2014).
17Thus, according to economics jargon, I assume that the information provided to the court is hard. Models
with verifiable information seem reasonable in a trial setting in which falsifying evidence imposes large penalties
on the party. For the soft-information approach to court decision-making, see Emons and Fluet (2009a,b).
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suppressing a relevant piece of evidence. Thus, accounting for such motives of the expert, the
court can extract some amount of information even when the expert reveals no hard evidence,
which will be clarified in the subsequent analysis.
I assume that an unbiased expert truthfully reports her evidence to the court: if she
observed the hidden evidence, she reports it to the court; if she could not observe it, she
does not reveal any evidence. In contrast, a biased expert truthfully reveals only favorable
evidence for her client: if the biased expert hired by the defendant observed x = H, the expert
reports it to the court; if the expert observed evidence unfavorable to the defendant, x = L,
the expert conceals it by not reporting any evidence. The expert also reveals no evidence if
she could not observe any evidence. Thus, when a biased expert reveals no hard evidence, the
court cannot ascertain whether she is suppressing valuable evidence or whether she could not
observe the hidden evidence. The expert hired by the plaintiff exhibits similar behavior.18
The timeline is as follows. In period 1, the litigants simultaneously choose whether to
retain a biased expert or an unbiased expert. The court cannot directly observe the litigants’
choices and therefore cannot observe whether the expert proffered by a litigant is biased or not.
In period 2, the retained experts have a chance to observe the hidden evidence, x ∈ {H,L},
and to testify to the court. In period 3, the court renders a verdict regarding whose cause
should prevail after forming its final assessment by employing Bayes’ rule. Finally, to avoid
uninteresting cases, I assume µ ∈ (1 − p, p).19 The solution concept is the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, which is simply referred to as equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, I derive the equilibria of the model. The analysis is divided into three steps. In
the first subsection, I study the experts’ behavior and the court’s decision-making in periods 2
and 3, where the court takes the litigants’ behavior as given. Because the court cannot observe
the bias of the expert proffered by a litigant, it must form a belief regarding the litigant’s
choice of expert. Such a belief can be arbitrary in this step of the analysis, but eventually, it
must be consistent with the litigants’ actual behavior in the last step of the analysis, in which
I derive the equilibria of the model. In the second subsection, using backward induction, I
investigate the litigants’ strategies in period 1. In this stage, a litigant chooses the type of his
expert, with the other litigant’s choice and the court’s belief taken as given. Finally, in the
third subsection, I derive the equilibria of the model, where I require the litigants’ and the
18Rather than assuming an expert’s behavior directly, one can derive such behavior as part of the equilibrium
by specifying an expert’s payoff structure. As such a generalization of the basic model is tedious and does not
contribute to our understanding of the core mechanism in the model, I adopt a reduced form approach with
respect to the experts’ behavior as specified above.
19If the prior probability is outside this range, the hidden evidence cannot influence the court’s decision
because the court’s prior assessment about the truth is too strong.
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experts’ behavior to be consistent with the court’s belief and decision.
3.1 The Court’s Belief and Decision
I analyze the model by first considering the experts’ behavior and the court’s belief and
decision in periods 2 and 3, given the litigants’ behavior. Because the court cannot directly
observe the litigants’ actions, it must form its belief about their actions. The court’s belief
about the probability that the defendant (the plaintiff) chose a biased expert is denoted by
ψD ∈ [0, 1] (ψP ∈ [0, 1]).
Suppose that hidden evidence x is revealed by any expert to the court. Then, the court’s
posterior belief is given by λ(x) ≡ P (t = h|x). More precisely, using Bayes’ rule, I have
λ(H) =
µp










where the inequalities follow because µ ∈ (1− p, p). Thus, the hidden evidence, if uncovered
and revealed, influences the court’s belief and decision. If evidence that is favorable to the
defendant is revealed, the court upholds the cause of the defendant because the defendant is
more likely not liable than liable, and vice versa.
What happens if no evidence is revealed by any expert? I denote by φ the situation in
which no expert reveals evidence to the court. In this case, the court’s posterior belief is
denoted by λ(φ) ≡ P (t = h|φ). More precisely, using Bayes’ rule, I obtain λ(φ) by
λ(φ) =
µqh
µqh + (1− µ)ql (3)
where
qh = (1− eD)(1− eP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
+ eD(1− eP )ψD(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
+ (1− eD)ePψP p︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C)
ql = (1− eD)(1− eP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A′)
+ eD(1− eP )ψDp︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B′)
+ (1− eD)ePψP (1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C′)
In the expressions above, qh is the probability that, given t = h, no expert reveals evidence to
the court. This probability is a sum of three terms. The first term (A) is the probability that
both experts could not observe the hidden evidence. The second term (B) is the probability
that only the defendant’s expert observed the hidden evidence but did not reveal it: eD(1−eP )
is the probability that only the defendant’s expert observed x; evidence distortion on the
defendant’s side occurs if the expert is a biased expert (with probability ψD); the defendant’s
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expert must have observed unfavorable evidence (i.e., x = L) because she conceals it, and the
probability for the expert to observe such evidence is P (x = L|t = h) = 1− p. The last term
(C) is analogous to (B): this term is the probability that evidence manipulation occurs on
the plaintiff’s side. Combining these three possibilities, I obtain qh. The other probability, ql,
can be similarly understood.
Thus, when no expert reveals evidence at trial, after forming its posterior belief λ(φ),
the court upholds the defendant’s cause if λ(φ) ≥ 12 and upholds the plaintiff’s cause if
λ(φ) < 12 . As differentiating these two cases is useful for the equilibrium analysis, I introduce
the following definition:
Definition 1. If the defendant’s cause prevails in the absence of evidence at trial (i.e., λ(φ) ≥
1
2), the burden of proof is said to be on the plaintiff. If the plaintiff’s cause prevails in the
absence of evidence at trial (i.e., λ(φ) < 12), the burden of proof is said to be on the defendant.
3.2 The Litigants’ Strategies
In this subsection, using backward induction, I investigate the ways in which a litigant selects
his own expert, with the other litigant’s strategy and the court’s belief taken as given.
Suppose that the defendant believes that the court’s belief about the litigants’ behavior is
such that the burden of proof will be on the plaintiff, that is, λ(φ) ≥ 12 . Then, if the defendant
selects a biased expert, his expected payoff is20
pibD = (1− ePP (x = L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(A)
)× 1
= 1− eP (µ(1− p) + (1− µ)p) (4)
Under the defendant’s current belief about the burden of proof assignment, he believes that
he will lose at trial if and only if the plaintiff’s expert can provide hard evidence against the
defendant’s cause, x = L. Such a belief arises because (i) if x = H is revealed by any expert,
the defendant wins at trial (as λ(H) > 12), (ii) if no evidence is revealed by any expert, the
defendant also wins (because the defendant believes that λ(φ) ≥ 12), and (iii) the defendant
loses under the revelation of x = L, which will only be revealed by the plaintiff’s expert (both
biased and unbiased). Thus, unless the plaintiff’s expert observes x = L (with probability
(A)), the defendant wins at trial and obtains a payoff of 1, which provides us with the expected
payoff in (4).
20The superscript b and the subscript D are used to denote the defendant’s expected payoff with a biased
expert, pibD. Notations for other expected payoffs can be similarly understood.
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If the defendant selects an unbiased expert, his expected payoff is
piuD = (1− (eP + (1− eP )eD︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
)P (x = L))× 1
= 1− (eP + (1− eP )eD)(µ(1− p) + (1− µ)p) (5)
The expression above shows that the defendant is more likely to lose with an unbiased expert.
Even when the plaintiff’s expert cannot provide unfavorable evidence x = L, such evidence
can still be provided by the defendant’s unbiased expert with probability (B). This increased
probability of the revelation of unfavorable evidence reduces the defendant’s expected payoff,
and therefore the defendant strictly prefers a biased expert to an unbiased expert if the
defendant believes that the burden of proof will be on the plaintiff’s side.
It is straightforward to show that the plaintiff’s behavior is analogous: if the plaintiff
believes that the burden of proof will be assigned to the defendant, the plaintiff strictly
prefers a biased expert to an unbiased expert.
Now, suppose that the defendant believes that the burden of proof will be on the defendant
himself, that is, λ(φ) < 12 . Then, if the defendant selects a biased expert, his expected payoff
is
pibD = ( eD︸︷︷︸
(A)
+ (1− eD)(1− ψP )eP︸ ︷︷ ︸
(B)
)P (x = H)× 1
= (eD + (1− eD)(1− ψP )eP )(µp+ (1− µ)(1− p)) (6)
where 1 − ψP is the probability that the plaintiff selects an unbiased expert. Because the
defendant believes that he bears the burden of proof, he wins at trial only when the revealed
evidence is favorable to his cause. The evidence may be favorable to the defendant’s cause in
two cases. First, the defendant’s expert observes and reveals x = H at trial (with probability
(A)). Second, although the defendant’s expert could not observe the favorable evidence, the
plaintiff’s unbiased expert can truthfully reveal such evidence (with probability (B)). Adding
these probabilities multiplied by a payoff of 1 from winning at trial provides us with the
expression (6).
If the defendant chooses an unbiased expert instead, his expected payoff is equal to that
with a biased expert, that is, piuD = pi
b
D. The expected payoff remains unchanged for two
reasons. First, a biased expert’s evidence distortion is not beneficial to the defendant under
the current burden of proof assignment (according to the defendant’s belief). If a biased
expert observed unfavorable evidence, x = L, she does not reveal it to the court; however,
the defendant nevertheless loses at trial because regardless of whether the plaintiff’s side
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reveals21 or does not reveal x = L (leading to situation φ), the court upholds the plaintiff’s
cause. Second, to win at trial, the defendant’s side is required to present hard evidence for his
cause, x = H. However, because evidence is verifiable, an expert cannot fabricate favorable
evidence. Thus, the frequency with which a biased expert presents favorable evidence at trial
is equal to that with which an unbiased expert presents favorable evidence. Combining these
two effects, I conclude that the choice of an expert does not affect the defendant’s winning
probability at trial; therefore, the defendant is indifferent between a biased expert and an
unbiased expert.
It is again straightforward to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s behavior is analogous: if the
plaintiff believes that he bears the burden of proof, he is indifferent between a biased expert
and an unbiased expert. These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If a litigant believes that he bears the burden of proof at trial, he is indifferent
between a biased expert and an unbiased expert. Instead, if a litigant believes that the other
party bears the burden of proof at trial, he strictly prefers a biased expert to an unbiased expert.
3.3 The Equilibria of the Model
In this subsection, I find the equilibria of the model in which the litigants’ and the experts’
behavior are consistent with the court’s belief and decision.
Suppose the court’s belief is such that the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, that is,
λ(φ) ≥ 12 . Then, according to Proposition 1, the defendant strictly prefers a biased expert to
an unbiased expert, and the plaintiff is indifferent between the two types of experts. Therefore,
given that the court’s belief is against the plaintiff, the litigants’ equilibrium strategies must
be such that
ψ∗D = 1 and ψ
∗
P ∈ [0, 1] (7)
which implies that the defendant employs a pure strategy regarding his choice of expert and
that the plaintiff uses a mixed strategy because he is indifferent between the two types of
expert.
It remains to verify whether the equilibrium strategies in (7) are consistent with the court’s
belief under φ. Under (ψ∗D, ψ
∗




µq∗h + (1− µ)q∗l
≥ 1
2
q∗h = (1− eD)(1− eP ) + eD(1− eP )(1− p) + (1− eD)ePψ∗P p
q∗l = (1− eD)(1− eP ) + eD(1− eP )p+ (1− eD)ePψ∗P (1− p)
21If the defendant’s expert observed and suppressed x = L, the plaintiff’s expert must have observed the
same evidence (if she observed the evidence) because both experts have access to the same hidden evidence.
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Simplifying the conditions above provides us with the following condition on ψ∗P :
ψ∗P ≥
(1− 2µ) + (p− µ) eD1−eD
(µ− (1− p)) eP1−eP
≡ f(µ) (8)
This condition provides us with a lower bound on ψ∗P for the existence of the equilibrium
in which the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. Such a condition for the existence of the
equilibrium is intuitive. If the plaintiff’s equilibrium strategy is such that he chooses a biased
expert with a very small probability (i.e., small ψ∗P ), in the absence of evidence (i.e., under
φ), the court’s equilibrium “skepticism” about the plaintiff’s expert testimony must be small
because the plaintiff’s expert is highly likely to be unbiased and truth-telling. Thus, the evi-
dence distortion from the plaintiff’s side is weighed less heavily in the court’s belief formation,
which reduces the court’s equilibrium belief (i.e., small λ∗(φ)). Therefore, a low level of ψ∗P
cannot be consistent with a high value of λ∗(φ), which requires condition (8) for the existence
of the equilibrium.











For example, if eD = eP (i.e., the experts from both sides are equally likely to observe the





= 1. In this case, if µ < 12 , there is no equilibrium in which
the burden of proof is on the plaintiff; if µ = 12 , the plaintiff must choose a biased expert
with probability 1 to sustain the equilibrium; and if µ > 12 , the plaintiff is allowed to choose
an unbiased expert with a positive probability in equilibrium. Thus, as the initial situation
becomes more favorable toward the plaintiff (i.e., small µ), he appoints a biased expert with
a higher frequency in equilibrium.
It is intuitive that the lower bound, f(µ), is decreasing in µ. If µ is small, before listening
to expert testimony, the court believes that the defendant is highly likely to be liable. Thus,
to place the burden of proof on the plaintiff in equilibrium, the plaintiff must appoint a biased
expert sufficiently often (i.e., high f(µ)) such that the court’s skepticism about the plaintiff’s
expert testimony weighs heavily in its belief formation, which would thereby increase λ∗(φ)
beyond 12 .
These results are summarized in the following proposition. As the analysis for the other
equilibrium in which the burden of proof is placed on the defendant is analogous, I present
the result without a proof.
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Proposition 2. There is a function
f(µ) =
(1− 2µ) + (p− µ) eD1−eD
(µ− (1− p)) eP1−eP
such that there is an equilibrium in which ψ∗D = 1 and ψ
∗
P ∈ [0, 1] are the litigants’ strategies
and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff if and only if ψ∗P ≥ f(µ). Similarly, there is a
function
g(µ) =
(µ− (1− p)) eP1−eP − (1− 2µ)
(p− µ) eD1−eD
such that there is an equilibrium in which ψ∗D ∈ [0, 1] and ψ∗P = 1 are the litigants’ strategies
and the burden of proof is on the defendant if and only if ψ∗D > g(µ).
4 Discussion
4.1 Prespecified Burden of Proof
The foregoing analysis showed that the burden of proof was determined in equilibrium in the
form of presumption against a party under the no-evidence event. In practice, the court may
not have discretion and just follow prespecified rules (as a black letter law) in allocating the
burden of proof between the litigants; for example, in criminal cases, the burden of proof is
typically placed on the prosecution, which must prove that the defendant is guilty before a
jury may convict him, where the failure to provide favorable evidence for prosecution leads
to the defendant’s win.
It turns out that my main result holds in this situation as well. Suppose the burden of
proof is always on the plaintiff and the failure to provide evidence favorable for the plaintiff
leads to the defendant’s win; in other words, the court upholds the cause of the defendant
under φ regardless of its belief, λ(φ). Observe that Proposition 1, which states the findings
about the litigants’ incentive, remains intact in this situation because what matters for the
litigants is the court’s decision, not the court’s belief per se. Thus, according to Proposition
1, the defendant deploys a hired gun that only reveals x = H whenever possible, and the
plaintiff is willing to provide unbiased testimony. Moreover, the plaintiff can supply unbiased
testimony without any constraint on his choice. To see this point more clearly, observe
Proposition 2 demonstrates that the plaintiff cannot provide unbiased testimony too often in
equilibrium because otherwise the no-evidence event could induce the court to rule in favor of
the plaintiff, thereby disrupting the equilibrium. In contrast, if the court upholds the cause of
the defendant under φ regardless of its belief, the plaintiff’s choice of expert cannot influence
the court’s decision under φ, and therefore no constraint on the plaintiff’s choice is necessary
to sustain the equilibrium. Thus, my main result holds with added force in this situation.
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4.2 Testable Implications
What are the testable implications for the result that litigants may have different incentive to
deploy hired guns? One interesting avenue for empirical research is to investigate the extent
to which the win rates of motions to dismiss raised by the litigants correlate with litigation
environments.
In criminal cases, my main result predicts that the defendant presents biased expert tes-
timony more often than the plaintiff because the burden of proof is typically on the plaintiff
in those lawsuits. An empirical implication is that if biased expert testimony is more likely
to be dismissed than unbiased testimony upon challenges from the opposing counsel, ceteris
paribus, courts are more likely to strike the defendant’s expert. In their study of criminal cases
in appellate courts, Groscup et al. (2002) present some evidence suggesting experts proffered
by the prosecution were more likely to be admitted than experts proffered by defendants: at
the trial court level, prosecution experts were admitted 95.8% of the time, but defendant-
appellant experts were admitted only 7.8% of the total number of times they were offered.
This pattern was slightly less pronounced at the appellate level, with prosecution experts
admitted 85.1% of the time and defense experts admitted 18.8% of the total number of times
they were offered. A reason for this very large difference could be attributed to the fact that
the focus rests on the cases appealed mostly by the defendant.
Slightly different figures are reported for civil cases by Dixon and Gill (2001) and Cooper
(2015). Dixon and Gill find no statistically significant difference in the admission of expert
testimony proffered by defendants and plaintiffs. Cooper reports a sizable difference in this
variable, noting that the defendant’s and plaintiff’s Daubert motion win rates are 0.5 and
0.4 on average, respectively, which is opposite to the finding from criminal cases. However,
Daubert motion win rates in his data set vary across the nature of suits: the plaintiff has
a higher win rates for motions in real property, antitrust, and intellectual property suits,
whereas the defendant has an edge in other types of suits. These different figures in civil cases
could arise because of the different assignment of the burden of proof across jurisdictions in
civil cases because, although the plaintiff is normally charged with the burden of proof, the
defendant can be required to establish certain defenses.
Cooper also shows that for plaintiffs, unsuccessful Daubert motions are associated with
a one-third lower win rate in subsequent litigation than successful motions, whereas there is
no statistically measurable association between the outcome of defendants’ Daubert motions
and subsequent litigation outcomes. According to my model, supposing the burden of proof
is on the plaintiff, the defendant deploys hired guns more often than the plaintiff; therefore, if
the plaintiff’s motion is unsuccessful, the judge’s decision will be influenced by biased expert
testimony proffered by the defendant, which would adversely affect the plaintiff’s litigation
outcomes. In contrast, even when the defendant’s motion fails, it is possible that the plaintiff’s
14
expert is neutral and truth-telling, and therefore the influence of expert testimony on the
defendant’s win rate at trial could be relatively neutral. It would be interesting to take a
closer look at these issues in future studies.
4.3 Evidence Verifiability
The main analysis assumes that evidence supplied by the experts is verifiable, so they can hide
unfavorable evidence but cannot fabricate favorable evidence.22 Instead, if I allow experts to
fabricate any evidence favorable for their clients’ causes, an immediate consequence is that
the value of information proffered by the experts in the fact-finding process decreases. In the
main analysis, the presentation of favorable evidence leads to a sure win for the party that
the evidence favors (i.e., the revelation of H leads to the defendant’s win and vice versa), but
this is not the case anymore because the information content of the presented evidence now
depends on the court’s belief about the litigants’ choice of experts. For instance, even if the
defense expert presents favorable evidence (i.e., H), the court may not rule in favor of the
defense because the information value of H is very small if the court believes that the defense
expert is highly likely to be a hired gun that fabricated favorable evidence.
It turns out that in the current framework, the falsifiable evidence assumption leads to
the complete breakdown of the communication channel between the parties and the court,
rendering the fact-finding process meaningless. To be more precise, assume that the evidence
is not verifiable, so biased experts can concoct and present favorable evidence to the court. In
such a situation, is it possible to sustain an equilibrium in which a litigant proffers unbiased
testimony? Suppose the plaintiff appoints an unbiased expert in equilibrium. Then, the
court admits any evidence proffered by the plaintiff’s expert, considering it as accurate and
objective information; moreover, under the no-evidence event, the court does not exercise any
skepticism toward the plaintiff’s silence because it believes that the plaintiff’s expert is silent
just because he does not possess any evidence. Such a belief formation process is beneficial for
the plaintiff because less skepticism means a higher chance of winning under the no-evidence
event.
Anticipating such a response by the court, the plaintiff, in the first place, has incentive
to deviate to deploying a hired gun23 because the plaintiff can raise his winning probability
by having the biased expert fabricate favorable evidence, which will be taken as accurate and
objective information under the equilibrium presumption held by the court. Thus, it is not
possible to sustain an equilibrium in which a litigant proffers unbiased testimony when the
evidence is not verifiable.
This discussion suggests that to maintain the quality of adversarial fact-finding processes,
22Although evidence is typically assumed to be verifiable in the litigation game literature, Emons and Fluet
(2009a,b) study a litigation game where evidence fabrication is possible.
23This reasoning is feasible because the court cannot directly observe the bias of the expert.
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it is imperative to accurately verify evidence proffered by parties and to impose large penal-
ties on those who fabricated evidence. A neutral court-advisor could prove useful for this
purpose,24 particularly in case of forensic science evidence, as judges are often ill-prepared for
evaluating pieces of evidence proffered by experts, although there could be a repercussion as
discussed by Kim and Koh (2015).25
4.4 Juror Naivety
In the United States, jury trials are widely used in criminal cases and seen as a line of defense
against the state’s ability to inappropriately deprive individuals of life and liberty.26 However,
jury trials in civil cases have been criticized by many legal scholars and practitioners, especially
when those cases involve complex scientific or statistical evidence proffered by experts because,
as the argument goes, lay juries are ill-prepared to evaluate such complex evidence.27 Thus,
although I assume the fact-finder is Bayesian in the main analysis, in practice, she may not
be able to use such a sophisticated reasoning. Moreover, juries are often instructed not to
make a negative inference from a party’s failure to testify. How does juror naivety influence
the main results?
If the jurors cannot make a negative inference, their posterior belief under the no-evidence
event φ is equal to the prior belief µ, that is, λ(φ) = µ. Then, according to Definition
1, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff if µ ≥ 12 and on the defendant otherwise. If the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff, Proposition 1 shows that the defendant deploys a hired gun
whereas the plaintiff is willing to provide unbiased testimony, which can be shown to constitute
an equilibrium. In fact, this constellation of litigant strategies constitutes an equilibrium
regardless of the plaintiff’s choice probability of unbiased experts,28 and therefore the plaintiff
is allowed to supply unbiased testimony more often in equilibrium under juror naivety.
24Federal Rule of Evidence 706 states that a judge may appoint court-advisors of his own selection. Yet,
Rule 706 has been infrequently invoked since its enactment because many judges have been reluctant to appoint
court-advisors out of concern that doing so will interfere with the adversarial process (Cecil and Willging, 1994).
See Section 4.6 for a related discussion.
25Within a standard litigation game, Kim and Koh (2015) study the effect of court-advisors on the litigants’
incentive to proffer evidence. They find that the court’s appointment of court-advisors could reduce the
litigants’ incentive to supply evidence. In general, there have been numerous reform proposals suggesting
that the judge appoint his own advisors, thereby enhancing the inquisitorial component in the American legal
system. See Section 4.6 for references.
26The right to a jury trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment for criminal trials. The Seventh Amend-
ment guarantees this right for civil trials where the amount in controversy exceeds $20.
27See, for instance, Kalven and Zeisel (1966) and Simon (1975) for the controversy over the merits of using
lay juries. In Skidmore v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 116 F.2d 54 (1947), Judge Jerome Frank wrote: “While
the jury can contribute nothing of value so far as the law is concerned, it has infinite capacity for mischief,
for twelve men can easily misunderstand more law in a minute than the judge can explain in an hour.” Dean
Griswold of Harvard Law School argued (Guinther, 1988): “The jury trial at best is the apotheosis of the
amateur. Why should anyone think that 12 persons brought in from the street, selected in various ways, for
their lack of general ability, should have any special capacity for deciding controversies between persons?”
28The reasoning is similar to that in Section 4.1.
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It is interesting to find that juror naivety could increase, rather than decrease, a litigant’s
incentive to supply unbiased testimony. However, it would be far-fetched to claim that this
result is general because there could be many factors behind a litigant’s behavioral response to
juror naivety. Rather, this discussion suggests a mechanism, not considered in the literature,
that juror naivety may correlate negatively with adversarial bias. It would be an interesting
avenue for future research to study the relationship between these two important variables in
more general settings.
4.5 Adversarial Bias and the Daubert Test
Contrary to public concerns about adversarial bias in American courtrooms, the main result
suggests that a litigant may voluntarily appoint an unbiased truth-telling expert at trial. If a
court, in applying the Daubert test, dismisses the testimony by such a truth-telling expert as
inadmissible, it will discard a neutral piece of evidence that is beneficial for its decision-making
process and will thereby reduce the accuracy of its final verdict. If the rationale behind the
strict admissibility standard is the existence of adversarial bias as Bernstein (2008) argues, a
litigant’s voluntary appointment of truth-telling experts weakens the argument for the Daubert
test in certain situations as suggested by the main results.
A policy implication is that courts could apply the Daubert test to a varying degree
in each case. The model suggests that a positive association exists between the litigation
environment and adversarial bias in that as the litigation environment becomes more favorable
for a litigant, he is more likely to present biased expert testimony. In particular, the burden of
proof assignment and the court’s prior belief are shown to influence adversarial bias. As these
results provide us with information regarding which party to litigation has a higher likelihood
of buying hired guns, courts could utilize such information in each lawsuit and apply a more
stringent admissibility test to one party than the other.
4.6 Centralized Institution
Many legal scholars and practitioners have long argued for a centralized system for expert
testimony, which would allow judges to appoint neutral experts rather than require litigants
to appoint their own experts. In particular, numerous reform proposals have suggested that
courts should appoint their own experts, which would enhance the inquisitorial component of
the American legal system.29 Indeed, Gross (1991) describes the use of non-partisan experts
29For example, see Runkle (2001), who discusses the structure of the Court Appointed Scientific Experts
program created by the American Association for the Advancement of Science in order to help judges obtain
independent experts. See also Hillman (2002), Adrogue and Ratliff (2003), Kaplan (2006), Robertson (2010),
and Kim (2015a), among others. Based on his experience as Judge Richard Posner’s court-appointed economic
expert, Sidak (2013) argues for the use of court-appointed neutral economic experts. Many reformers, most
famously Hand (1901), argue that the appropriate remedy to adversarial bias (combined with inexpert juries)
is increased reliance on court-appointed nonpartisan experts.
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as “[t]he most frequently suggested reform.” Kaye et al. (2010) also note that “from the later
part of the nineteenth century to the present, the dominant proposed solution to the problems
of adversarial experts has been to call for the use of non-adversarial experts, in order to create
a nonpartisan source of expert knowledge.”
A typical argument against such reform is as follows: as the current American legal sys-
tem is inherently adversarial, establishing a centralized institution may create conflict in the
operation of the legal system. My analysis provides another argument against the reform for
a centralized system: if the purpose of establishing a centralized institution is to guarantee
the existence of neutral experts in courtrooms, such an institution may not be worth the
cost because neutral and unbiased voices remain heard under the current system to a certain
extent. Thus, detailed cost–benefit analyses are called for to accurately assess the value of
the reform.
4.7 The Exclusionary Rule
Daughety and Reinganum (2000a,b) argue that during the trial process, courts cannot purely
follow a Bayesian approach because they are constrained by evidentiary rules along with other
characteristics of the trial process. One of the evidentiary rules studied extensively in the law
and economics literature is the exclusionary rule, whereby evidence pertaining to a propensity
for the defendant to act a certain way should be discarded as inadmissible.30 In a series of
influential articles, Demougin and Fluet (2005, 2006, 2008) interpret the exclusionary rule in
the civil context as imposing a “neutral” prior belief (i.e., µ = 12) on the court’s decision-
making, and they demonstrate that the exclusionary rule maximizes deterrence when it is
used along with the preponderance of evidence standard.
My analysis suggests that if I follow Demougin and Fluet’s interpretation of the exclusion-
ary rule in the civil context, the rule may also affect adversarial bias. For example, suppose
that the quality of the experts provided by the litigants is the same (i.e., eD = eP ) and that
the court’s prior belief is favorable to the defendant (i.e., µ > 12). Then, the main analysis
shows that in the equilibrium with the burden of proof on the plaintiff, the plaintiff may vol-
untarily appoint a neutral expert at trial. In this situation, the imposition of the exclusionary
rule (which changes the court’s prior belief to µ = 12) alters the litigants’ incentives, inducing





= 1). On the other hand, if the
court’s prior belief was favorable to the plaintiff (i.e., µ < 12), the adoption of the exclusionary
rule may support the existence of an equilibrium that is not possible without the rule. In the
former situation, the exclusionary rule may exacerbate the adversarial bias problem at trial,
and in the latter situation, the rule may be beneficial for society as it supports the existence
of equilibrium outcomes.
30Schrag and Scotchmer (1994) analyze the deterrence justification for the dismissal of character evidence
in criminal trials. Sanchirico (2001) provides a discussion on this issue.
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